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ROBUST REPUTATION-BASED RANKING ON MULTIPARTITE RATING
NETWORKS
JOA˜O SAU´DE˚, GUILHERME RAMOS˚, CARLOS CALEIRO, AND SOUMMYA KAR
ABSTRACT. The spread of online reviews, ratings and opinions and its growing influence
on people’s behavior and decisions boosted the interest to extract meaningful information
from this data deluge. Hence, crowdsourced ratings of products and services gained a crit-
ical role in business, governments, and others. We propose a new reputation-based ranking
system utilizing multipartite rating subnetworks, that clusters users by their similarities,
using Kolmogorov complexity. Our system is novel in that it reflects a diversity of opin-
ions/preferences by assigning possibly distinct rankings, for the same item, for different
groups of users. We prove the convergence and efficiency of the system and show that it
copes better with spamming/spurious users, and it is more robust to attacks than state-of-
the-art approaches.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays electronic commerce, streaming media and the collaborative economy (such
as car rides and accommodation) are ubiquitous in our daily life. People’s opinion can be
as effective as an advertisement. This promoted the development of crowdsourced ratings
and reviews. Consumers started to use and rely on this information to decide whether or
not to buy a product/service, have a meal on a certain restaurant, or simply attend an event,
see [20, 7]. Aware of how ratings of products/services can impact sales, [3], the sellers, in
turn, rely on the ratings and reviews of their products to assess their commercial viability
as well as to predict sales, [6]. Further, they use this information not only to improve
their products, but also to target advertisement campaigns. Online ratings and reviews
are perceived so important that it is desirable to detect and automatically correct rating
manipulations through fake users’ ratings.
Previous work. A simple way to collect and process the huge amount of ratings is using
the arithmetic average (AA). Some of the drawbacks of the AA are the indistinguishability
of users, so it treats the most relevant raters and spam in the same way. Therefore AA
is prone to manipulation of ratings through malicious attacks or spamming. Further, AA
might be misleading, because it does not capture the possible multimodal behavior of rat-
ings, see [10]. For instance, in a bimodal distribution of ratings on the opposite extremes,
the average would be located in the middle where the density of votes of users is low.
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FIGURE 1. Graph representing N users, ui, M items, oj , and the rat-
ings given by user i to item j, Rij . The lines represent the connection,
through ratings, from the users to the items. The dashed lines represent
the links between users, through their similarities, smn.
Using weighted average algorithms allows us to attribute different importance to certain
users. This was explored in previous works [22, 5]. The authors in [17] used a modification
of the weighted average. In [19], the author uses an additional time-dependent quantity to
weigh the ratings of users. These methods are more robust to spamming and attacks than
the AA.
The methods above have a bipartite graph structure. There are two types of nodes, users
and items, and weighted edges (ratings) linking the two, see Figure 1, when not considering
the dashed lines. This kind of algorithm does not take into account possible relations
between users or users’ preferences. Furthermore, these approaches do not incorporate the
(possible) multimodal behavior of items’ ratings. Hence it forces all users to subjugate to
the average, that in turn hinders the rise of a multitude of preferences/tastes/tendencies.
In prior work [21], the authors extended the bipartite graph approaches. They used im-
plicit social networks, known as online Social Rating Networks (SRN) (that emerge from
different users commenting in a similar way on a given set of products) and explicit social
networks (built by users themselves, through friendship or working relation) to predict rat-
ings and recommend products. The subnetworks between users are represented in dashed
lines of Figure 1.
Our contribution. Exploring previous ideas, we propose a class of iterative reputation-
based ranking system on multipartite graphs. We first prove the convergence and efficiency
for a generic class of reputation-based ranking systems on bipartite graphs, that extends the
results of previous works. After, we use similarity measures to design a system that clus-
ters users solely based on their rating similarities, and then computes (possible) different
rankings for same items on different subnetworks. This enables us to present custom-built
rankings of items to each cluster (community). Our approach not only adapts better to
the preferences of similar users, but also improves robustness against spurious users or
spamming/malicious attacks. Further, it embeds the multimodal behavior of ratings’ dis-
tribution. This contrasts with the algorithms that we overviewed, because those neglect
the smaller sub-groups that do not identify with the majority. We propose two novel sim-
ilarity measures, the linear distance (LD) and the Kolmogorov distance (KD), and we test
the normalized compression distance (CD) proposed in [16]. Not only our approaches
perform better, but also they have smaller computational complexity than CD. A distin-
guishable feature of the LD comparing to KD is that the former responds better to noisy
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spam whereas the latter is slightly more robust to targeted attacks to a set of items. Both
carry the same order of computational complexity, although KD is faster, in our implemen-
tation, than LD. Finally, using LD we obtain better robustness results than state-of-the-art
approaches.
Paper structure. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe and prove
the convergence and efficiency of a class of reputation-based ranking iterative algorithms.
We propose a new reputation-based ranking system in Section 3, where we also prove its
convergence. Our new algorithm is in Section 2.0.1, and its implementation is explained
in Section 3. The experimental setup is described in Section 4 and we discuss our results
in Section 5. We end the paper with final conclusions in Section 6.
2. REPUTATION-BASED RANKING ALGORITHMS
A reputation-based ranking system assigns a reputation to each user and then utilizes it
to weigh their individual ratings on products in order to compute the products’ rankings.
Let U be a set of users, O a set of items, RK, RJ the minimum and maximum ratings,
respectively, with R “ rRK, RJs X Z` the set of strictly positive integers, the allowed
ratings, ∆R “ RJ ´ RK, and R Ď U ˆ O ˆ R be the set of ratings given by users to
items. For instances, if user i rates item j with rating Rij , then we write it as pi, j, Rijq P
U ˆ O ˆ R, or simply Rij P R. We denote the set of items rated by user i as Oi “
toj |DRij P R s.t. pui, oj , Rijq P Ru, the set of users that rated item j as Ij “ tui|DRij P
R s.t. pui, oj , Rijq P Ru. From now on, we consider normalized ratings, 0 ă Rij ď 1,
therefore the rankings and reputations take values in s0, 1s.
We model the ranking system on a weighted graph G “ pU Y O,Rq. We first consider
a bipartite graph, B, with the two sets of vertices given by users and items, see the sub-
graph in Figure 1 when only considering edges between users and items. Subsequently,
we consider an extra set of edges between the users’ vertices, connecting users that are
similar, see Figure 1. This gives rise to a multipartite graph, M. A multipartite graph is
a graph such that that to color vertices with a common edge using different colors with
need more than two colors, see [2]. Here, we need one color for the items and at least two
more whenever there is a cluster with more than one user. This can either model users’
networks generated by users themselves, like social networks see [21], or, as we propose,
automatically generated by the ranking systems based on ratings of items given by users. A
partition on subnetworks may also be done on the items’ side, although we do not explore
this possibility.
2.0.1. Bipartite graph algorithms. Here, we generalize the iterative reputation-based rank-
ing methods, discussed above, that take the form of:
(2.1)
#
rk`1 “ gRpckq
ck`1 “ hRprk`1q ,
where k denotes the iteration index and c0 the vector of initial reputation of users with
c0i Ps0, 1s. Here, r “ pr1, . . . , r|O|q with rj denoting the ranking of item j, computed with
the function gR : r0, 1s|U | Ñ r0, 1s|O|, with the set of ratings, R, as a parameter. The
users’ reputations, denoted as c “ pc1, . . . , c|U |q, where ci is the reputation of user i, are
determined by the function hR : r0, 1s|O| Ñ r0, 1s|U |.
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Next, we present more general results that subsume all the proofs of convergence and ef-
ficiency in [17]. This allows to design a wider range of convergent and efficient reputation-
based ranking systems. Consider a Banach space, X , with an induced distance d : X ˆ
X Ñ r0, 1s. Using the Lipschitz condition [14], we prove the following results.
Lemma 1. Consider the iterative scheme in (2.1). Let gR and hR be ηg and ηh-Lipschitz
maps, respectively. It follows that gR ˝ hR is an η-Lipschitz map, with η “ ηgηh. If η ă 1,
then (2.1) is a contraction.
Proof. Since the domain of g contains the codomain of h and both are Lipschitz the com-
position, g ˝ h, is also Lipschitz. Let d be a distance, we prove the induction’s basis:
dpr2, r1q “ d `gRpc1q, gRpc0q˘
“ d `pgR ˝ hRqpr1q, pgR ˝ hRqpr0q˘
ď ηdpr1, r0q,
where η P r0, 1r is the Lipschitz constant for gR ˝ hR. The induction step then reads
dprn, rn´1q “ d `gRpcn´1q, gRpcn´2q˘
“ d `pgR ˝ hRqprn´1q, pgR ˝ hRqprn´2q˘
ď ηd `rn´1, rn´2˘ “ ηd `gRpcn´2q, gRpcn´3q˘
ď ηn´1dpr1, r0q,
and the last inequality holds by the induction hypothesis. 
Because we are working in a Banach space the algorithm (2.1) converges to a unique
value. Using the previous lemma, we prove the following result:
Theorem 1. The class of iterative reputation-based ranking algorithms (2.1) converges.
Proof. Let m,n P N. For any ε ą 0, there exists an order, N , from which ηN ă p1 ´
ηqε{dpr1, r0q. Using the triangle inequality we have
dprn, rmq ď
nÿ
k“m`1
dprk, rk´1q ď
nÿ
k“m`1
ηk´1dpr1, r0q
ď ηmdpr1, r0q
`8ÿ
k“0
ηk ď ηN dpr
1, r0q
1´ η ă ε,
since 0 ă η ă 1, therefore the algorithm (2.1) converges. 
Theorem 2. Let d be a normalized distance, d : X Ñ r0, 1s. Then the algorithm (2.1) has
an exponential rate of convergence.
Proof. The basis of the induction reads:
dpr˚, r1q “ d `gRpc˚q, gRpc0q˘
“ d `pgR ˝ hRqpr˚q, pgR ˝ hRqpr0q˘
ď ηd `r˚, r0˘ ď η.
Assume that the induction hypothesis holds, for k “ n, then it follows that
dpr˚, rn`1q “ d ppgR ˝ hRqpr˚q, pgR ˝ hRqprnqq
ď ηd pr˚, rnq ď ηn`1d `r˚, r0˘ ď ηn`1.

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To attain an error of, at most, ε ą 0, we need κ “ logη ε iterations, where η is the
Lipschitz constant of gR ˝ hR.
2.0.2. Similarity Measures. To group users, according to their preferences/tastes, we need
to quantify how similar they are. For each pair of users, that have, at least, one rated item in
common, we compute a similarity distance, based on item-rating information. We specify
three different similarity distances: one linear and two non-linear. In the following, let
Iu,v “ IuX Iv denote the set of items that both users u and v rated. Further, for each user,
u, we denote by u˜ the string composed by the concatenation of the pairs pitem, ratingq of
its rated items.
Linear distance. We define the linear distance as: LDpu, vq “ 0 if IuXv “ ∅, and
otherwise
LDpu, vq “ `p|Iu,v|q
»–1´ 1|Iu,v| ÿiPIu,v
|Rui ´Rvi|
∆R
fifl ,
where Rjk is the rating that user j gave to item k and the function ` : Z` Ñ r0, 1s
penalizes on how confident we are in the users’ similarity.
We propose two compression-similarity distances based on Kolmogorov complexity,
see [4]. Given the description of a string, x, its Kolmogorov complexity,Kpxq, is the length
of the smallest computer program that outputs x. In other words, Kpxq is the length of the
smallest compressor for x. LetC be a compressor andCpxq denote the length of the output
string resulting from the compression of x using C. Although the Kolmogorov complexity
is non-computable, there are efficient and computable approximations by compressors.
Kolmogorov distance. We define the Kolmogorov distance as: KDpu, vq “ 0 if Iu,v “
∅, and otherwise
KDpu, vq “ p1` |Cpu˜q ´ Cpv˜q|q´1 .
If we think of u˜ as a training set and the compressor C as a taste/preferences profiler of the
users, then we can aggregate users u and v by computing the difference of their preferences
|Cpu˜q ´ Cpv˜q|.
Compression distance. Based on the normalized compression distance, see [16], we
define the compression distance as: CDpu, vq “ 0 if Iu,v “ ∅, and otherwise
CDpu, vq “ 1´ Cpu˜v˜q ´mintCpu˜q, Cpv˜qu
maxtCpu˜q, Cpv˜qu ,
for the string u˜v˜, the concatenation of u˜ and v˜.
2.0.3. Multipartite graph algorithms. Consider a similarity distance, SM . We group users
in communities using SM . For a specified affinity level threshold, α, we set Su,v “ 1 if
SM pu, vq ą α and 0 otherwise, where S is the (possible sparse) adjacency matrix, that
characterizes the undirected graph M ” MpSq. A bigger α means that users need to
be more strongly related in order to be connected, which translates to a finer granularity
in the communities. We compute the subnetworks of M, Mi for i P I, that are the
connected components of M. Then, we select the most relevant subnetworks tMjujPJ ,
with J Ď I. Subsequently, we apply the multipartite-graph algorithm to each subnetwork
Mj , for j P J to compute the reputation of users and the ranking of items.
Let rep rank denote a reputation-based ranking algorithm (2.1). We summarize the
previous steps in the clustering reputation-based ranking Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Clustering reputation-based ranking algorithm.
1: input: α, dataset
2: build S from dataset and apply threshold α
3: build M ”MpSq
4: find the connected components of M, tMiumi“1
5: output: weighted average of trep rankpMiqumi“1
3. IMPLEMENTATION
From now on, we will consider algorithms defined by the equations (3.1) and (3.2)
below. We compute the ranking of the object, rj , as a weighted average. That is, the
ratings of user i to item j are weighted by the users’ reputation, ci, and therefore gR
in (2.1) becomes:
(3.1) rk`1j “
ÿ
uiPIj
Rijc
k`1
i
N ÿ
uiPIj
ck`1i .
For hR in (2.1), we tested three different functions parametrized by fλ,s:
(3.2) ck`1i “ 1´ fλ,spOiq ¨
$’’’’&’’’’%
1
|Oi|
ÿ
ojPOi
|Rij ´ rkj |p
max
ojPOi
|Rij ´ rkj |p
min
ojPOi
|Rij ´ rkj |p
.
The users’ reputation is chosen as a function of the average, maximum or minimum dis-
agreement of individual user’s ratings, Rij , and the rankings of the rated items, rj . In
order to control the penalization a user incurs on, for not rating according to the ranking,
we define a decay function fs. We consider three different decay functions:
i) f1λ,spxq “ λ ii) f2λ,spxq “ λ
`
1´ e´ x2 ˘
iii) f3λ,spxq “ λ
“
1´ p1´ υqp1` es´xq´1‰,
where λ P r0, 1r, υ Ps0, 1r is the lowest penalization an user can incur and s P N is a
parameter based on the number of rated items such that the penalization is decreased by
a half. The role of the decay function is to control the penalization a user i suffers if it
doesn’t rate the item, Rij , close to its ranking rj . The first, constant, function f1λ,s above is
proposed in [17], the second is an exponential decrease function, and the third is a logistic
function. In the second and third cases the penalization increases and decreases, respec-
tively, with the number of rated products. In the remaining of the paper we fix for hR the
average and for fλ,s the constant function, f1λ,s, denoting by bipartite weighted average
(BWA) the resulting iterative scheme in equations (3.1) and (3.2).
3.0.1. Convergence. Here, we prove the convergence of the proposed method. In what
follows, for a given vector x P Rn and p P Z`, the p-norm of x is }x}p “ přni“1 |xi|pq 1p ,
and the8-norm is }x}8 “ maxiPt1,...,nu |xi|.
Lemma 2. For all λ P r0, p1 ` ∆Rq´1r, the iterative method in (2.1) with functions gR
and hR defined as in (3.1) and (3.2) converges.
Proof. Between iterations, rk`1 and rk, we get
}rk`1j ´ rkj }8 “
››››Rj ¨ ck`1}ck`1}1 ´ Rj ¨ c
k
}ck}1
››››8 .
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Without loss of generality, assume that }ck`1}1 ě }ck}1, then the above difference is equal
to ››››Rj ¨ ck`1}ck`1}1 ´ Rj ¨ c
k
}ck`1}1 `
Rj ¨ ck
}ck`1}1 ´
Rj ¨ ck
}ck}1
››››8
ď
››››Rj ¨ ck`1}ck`1}1 ´ Rj ¨ c
k
}ck`1}1 `
Rj ¨ ck
}ck}1 ´
Rj ¨ ck
}ck}1
››››8
ď RJ}ck`1}1
ˇˇ
ck`1γ ´ ckγ
ˇˇ
,
where
ˇˇ
ck`1γ ´ ckγ
ˇˇ “ maxiPIj ˇˇck`1i ´ cki ˇˇ. The iteration step for the reputation, c, gives us
|ck`1i ´ cki | ď
|fλ,spOiq|
|Oi|
ÿ
j
ˇˇˇˇˇ
Rji ´ rkj
ˇˇp ´ ˇˇRji ´ rk´1j ˇˇp ˇˇˇ
ď λ|rkβ ´ rk´1β |,
where
ˇˇˇ
rk`1β ´ rkβ
ˇˇˇ
“ maxjPOi
ˇˇ
rk`1j ´ rkj
ˇˇ
, and using the triangular inequality, the trans-
lation invariance of norms and the fact that |fλ,spOiq| ď 1. Combining the previous in-
equalities we get
(3.3) |rk`1j ´ rkj | ď
λ
}ck`1}1 |r
k
β ´ rk´1β |.
Setting λ ă p1`∆Rq´1, since 1´∆Rλ ď }c}1 ď 1, we ensure that (3.3) is a contraction,
therefore (2.1) converges. 
In our simulations, we consider ∆R “ 1 ´ 0.2. Therefore if λ ď 59 then our proof
ensures that the algorithm converges. Notwithstanding, we ensure convergence for any
λ P r0, 1r modifying the denominator of (3.2) to be maxt}ck`1}1, 1u.
3.0.2. Computational complexity analysis. The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is given
by the sum of the complexities of each step. Let G “ pV,Eq denote a graph, where
V is a set of vertices and E a set of edges. Step 3 consists in building G, this is done
computing its sparse adjacency matrix, M, where each rating is used once. Henceforth,
the time complexity is Op|C||R|q, where |C| “ Op1q for similarities LD and KD, and
where, for the CD, |C| is the worst case complexity of compressing the concatenation of
pairs of users. Step 4 can be performed using Tarjan’s Algorithm [9], with time com-
plexity in the worst case of Op|V | ` |E|q. Step 5 has, in the worst case, the same time
complexity of [17], i.e., Opκ|R|q. In summary, Algorithm 1 has worst case time com-
plexity of O ppκ` |C|q|R| ` |V | ` |E|q. In theory |E| can be, in the worst case |U |2,
leading to a time complexity of O `pκ` |C|q|R| ` |U |2˘. In practice, since (often) the
users are sparsely connected in G, |E| “ Op|U |q, resulting in a time complexity of
O ppκ` |C|q|R| ` |U |q. In all cases the space complexity of Algorithm 1 is Op|R|q.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We run all experiments on macOS 10.12.3 with 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB 1600
MHz DDR3, in MATLAB 2016a.
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4.0.1. Datasets. In this work, we use real world datasets that were obtained from the Stan-
ford Large Network Dataset Collection, [15]. We used the 5-core version of “Amazon In-
stant Video” dataset that consist of users that rated at least 5 items, as in [18]. It has 5, 130
users, 1, 685 items and 37, 126 ratings, with RK “ 1 and RJ “ 5. These datasets include
only tuples of the form (user, item, rating, timestamp) and no metadata or reviews. We
normalized all ratings, dividing them by RJ.
4.0.2. Benchmarks. We compare our results with the reputation-based ranking system
in [17]. The authors already compared their algorithm with the state-of-the-art algorithms.
Namely, the HITS [13], the Mizz [19], the YZLM [22] and the dKVD [5] algorithms. Fur-
thermore, the authors of [17] showed that their algorithm outperforms all the others, in all
standard metrics.
4.0.3. Evaluation metrics. To quantitatively assess the quality of the ranking systems,
we compute the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, a.k.a. Kendall’s tau, τ , see [12].
This statistic measures the ordinal association between two quantities. Intuitively, the
Kendall correlation between two variables is higher when observations are identical and
lower otherwise. Given two sets X and Y , let C and D denote the sets of concordant
and discordant pairs of elements in X ˆ Y , respectively. The Kendall’s tau is defined as
τ “ p|C|´|D|q{p|C|`|D|q. The effectiveness is given by the Kendall tau of the rankings’
vector, r, versus a ground truth, rˆ, that is τpr, rˆq. The selection of the ground truth is an
intricate matter, for practical reasons we choose the AA. Because of its simplicity, and its
popularity among ranking systems, [11, 5]. Nonetheless, evaluating the discrepancy be-
tween the ranking vector, r, and the AA might not be very informative. Since it does not
capture the possible multimodal behavior of ratings, therefore might not be very useful to
evaluate the quality of a ranking system. When using fspxq “ λ “ 0.1, as in [17], we see
that it yield high effectiveness values (τ « 1). The reason is that in this case c P r0.9, 1s,
and we obtain rankings very close to AA, and in the case c “ 1 it yields the AA. This in
turn plays against what we want to achieve, a departure from the simplicity of AA, in or-
der to gain insight through an intelligent weighting of ratings. Therefore the effectiveness
might not be that important to evaluate the quality of a ranking system. In such a heteroge-
neous environment the AA do not carry useful information. So in the bipartite case we opt
for the robustness metric. In the multipartite case, the effectiveness may be helpful, since
we might want to check for homogeneity within the clusters. Henceforth, we generalize
the Kendall tau as
τ¯ “ 1|M|
Nÿ
i“1
|Mi|τMi , M “
Nď
i“1
Mi, Mi
č
Mj “ ∅,
where Mi is a subgraph of M, with |Mi| vertices. The effectiveness of a cluster, Mi, is
denoted by τprMi , rAA|Miq.
The robustness evaluates the ability of the algorithm to cope against noise or spamming
attacks. A noisy user gives random ratings to a random set of products, see [1]. Whilst
a spamming attacker targets a set of items with the intent of increasing (Push Attack) or
decreasing (Nuke Attack) their rankings. In our simulations, we run our algorithm in the
original dataset and in spammed ones. After, we compute the Kendall tau between the
rankings of the original dataset, that we assume as the ground truth, against the rankings
obtained with the spammed dataset.
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For the multipartite approach we compute the Kendall tau as τ¯ “ τpr¯, r¯spamq, where r¯
is the vector of r¯j’s given by
r¯j “ 1|Mˆ|
ÿ
m
|Mˆm|rmj , where Mˆ “
ď
m
Mˆm
is the union of subnetworks where users rated item j. The effectiveness within a subgroup,
Mi, is given by τprMi , rAAq, and it measures the homogeneity of the it. This measure is
useful to assess the quality of the partition of the original network, and it can be used to
tune the affinity level, α, between users so that they are in the same cluster.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we discuss the obtained results and evaluate our ranking algorithm using the ro-
bustness metric.
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For the ultipartite approach e co pute the Kendall tau as ⌧¯ “ ⌧pr¯, r¯spamq, where r¯
is the vector of r¯j’s given by
r¯j
1
| ˆ | |
ˆ |rj , where ˆ “
§
m
ˆ
m
is the union of subnet orks here users rated ite j. The effectiveness within a subgroup,
i, is given by ⌧pr i , r q, and it easures the homogeneity of the it. This measure is
sef l t assess t e quality of the partition of the original network, and it can be used to
t e t e affi it le el, ↵, bet een users so that they are in the same cluster.
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(F) Largest cluster r¯ for rep. attack.
FIGURE 2. The plots depict the variation of the Kendall ⌧¯ and of the
ranking of the targeted item, r¯target (the most voted), with respect to the
fraction of spammers from 0 to 0.75. For the random spam, (a), we con-
sider the fraction of the total number of users. For the love/hate attack,
(b)-(c), and for the reputation attack, (d)-(e), we consider the fraction of
the raters of r¯target. Figure (f) shows the variation of ⌧¯target in the biggest
cluster along no clustering systems.
Robustness. The robustness is a performance measure that evaluates the ability of a rank-
ing system to withstand spamming or ranking attacks. In order to mitigate the effect of
spammers/malicious users, we first propose using the function fs in the iterative method (2.1).
A second way to mitigate the spamming effect is grouping users into communities, as ex-
plained in Section 2.0.3.
In the bipartite graph scenario, the information available to a new user is every products’
rankings. This information can be used by malicious users to tamper with the ranking of
an item in a malicious way (push or nuke it.) For instances, in a reputation-based systems,
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an attacker can give ratings matching the ranking of items to increase its reputation, before
attacking an item.
Whereas when allowing for communities (subnetworks), either the user is already clas-
sified into a community and he access the item’s ranking within that community, or he is a
new user. In this case, the displayed ranking, r¯j , of the item, j, is the weighted average of
its ranking within each subnetwork.
Both of these scenarios mitigate the spamming effect. Since the information made
available is not a sufficient statistic, a user cannot fully recover all the information to attack,
in a more efficient way, the underlying ranking system.
In this section we discuss the robustness of the algorithm to different kinds of spam-
ming/attacks:
‚ Random spamming: A set of spammers give random ratings, uniformly distributed
on R, to a random number of items, following a Poisson distribution, starting at
1 with parameter λP “ 5. The rated items are randomly selected following the
distribution of the number of ratings per item, in the initial dataset.
‚ Love/hate attack: A set of spammers targets one item to push/nuke and selects
another set of items to nuke/push. In our simulations, each attacker nukes the
most voted item and pushes another random set of nine filler items.
‚ Reputation attack: In this case, a set of spammers targets one item to push/nuke
its ranking. They randomly select another fixed number of items, from the initial
dataset, typically the most popular ones, and give them the closest ratings to their
rankings. We discuss the nuke version, because the push attack is similar.
In all experiments we set λ “ 0.3, α “ 0.8, and for the LD method the confidence level
function `p|Iu,v|q “ θ´1 if |Iu,v| ď θ and 1 otherwise. The parameter θ sets the number
of common rated items of users u and v from which we are confident that they can be
similar. We choose θ “ 3. To evaluate the effect of the random spamming, we compute
the Kendall tau, τpr¯, r¯spamq. In the bipartite case, we see that BWA copes slightly better
with noise than the algorithm proposed in [17], which is claimed to be the best procedure
with convergence guarantees. Using the multipartite graph systems, we notice an increase
of robustness for the LD, and for the KD a similar robustness to the bipartite methods. The
CD performs the worst, because it is sensitive to accommodating new users by rearranging
the clusters, which in turn degrades the τ¯ , see Figure 2a.
To test the robustness (to attacks) of the methods we simulate attacks to the most voted
item, rtarget. We ranged the proportion of spammers from 0 to 0.75 of the fraction of to-
tal voters on the target item. For the love/hate attack, Figures 2b and 2c, we see that the
variation of the rating rtarget was smaller, henceforth the attack is less effective, when using
methods KD and LD. The smallest variation of τ occurs with method LD, guaranteeing
not only a strong robustness to the attack on rtarget, but also to possible side effects. On
the other hand, KD was very effective to deter the rank attack, but failed to prevent notice-
able changes on other items’ rankings. This is a consequence of the reorganization of the
subnetworks to minimize the effect of the attack on rtarget, and our generalization of the
Kendall tau does not account for this repercussion. Moreover, in the larger clusters con-
taining users who rated the targeted item, the ranking of the item was kept unchanged for
both LD and CD, the same effect as for the reputation attack in Figure 2f. This indicates
that the attackers are not grouped with normal users and thus do not affect the rankings of
items in the cluster. For KD, although the ranking oscillates due to the reorganization of
clusters, it is not nuked as in [17] and BWA.
ROBUST REPUTATION-BASED RANKING ON MULTIPARTITE RATING NETWORKS 11
Utilizing communities, the effect of the reputation attack on the ranking of the targeted
item was attenuated, see Figures 2d and 2e. Because the intelligent attacker chooses the
closest rating to the ranking of the filler items it should not affect drastically the rankings of
the filler items, and the attackers increase their reputation. The ranking of the nuked item,
using multipartite rating networks, drops less than when not using them. The organization
of communities changes with the increasing number of spammers, this is an effect of the
system to cope with the attack. Thus, it produces a bigger change in τ¯ , because it reduces
drastically the effect of the targeted attack, and since the ranking of the filler objects do
not change drastically (the attackers rate those items with their weighted average ranking)
it is not a very important side effect. Again, in the larger clusters containing users who
rated the targeted item, the ranking of the item was kept unchanged when using LD, had
a small variation for KD, and had a big variation for CD. Both last two variations reflect
the opposite effect on the ranking of the targeted item as what is intended by the attacker,
see Figure 2f. The clustering produced by KD and CD aggregate attackers with legit users
(that gave smaller ratings to the target item) on a separated cluster, leaving raters who gave
high on the biggest cluster. Further, observe that for new users, the displayed rankings are
a weighted average, whereas in each cluster they are the average within the cluster.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We develop a new multipartite ranking system that allows the coexistence of multiple
preferences by enabling different rankings for the same item for different users. This is
achieved by automatically clustering similar users, based on their given ratings. For each
cluster we use a bipartite reputation-based ranking system, for which we prove conver-
gence and efficiency in a more general setting than previous results. Although it favors the
creation of bubbles, i.e., segregates users into groups, we show that our method makes the
ranking system more robust to attacks and spamming.
As future work, we will investigate the effect of bribing users in order to influence the
ranking of items, as in [8]. And optimize and compute the cost of attacking the ranking of
items for systems where an user can only rate a bought item. Also, in order to reduce the
rate of change in the communities, we will explore the use of steadiness functions, based
on a timestamp, so that established clusters do not change so easily.
We can explore a good choice of decay function in order to penalize more the reputation
of users that are not similar to majority of users.
Another possible extension of the proposed algorithm is to use it for recommendation
systems.
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